The Marren and Page Case List Sly v Sly and York v York

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i) pay to that spouse from the member's disposable retired pay the least amount directed to be paid during that month by any such conflicting court order, but not more than the amount of disposable retired pay which remains availab1e for payment of such courts orders bas ed on when such court orders were effectively served and the limitations of paragraph (1) and subparagraph (8) of paragraph (4); UP> In other words, the dollars per month that the spouse would eventually collect only increases very slightly and slowly, and in the meantime, the spouse does NOT receive any part of the spousal interest accumulated up to that time. Given the realities of finite life expectancies, the spouse would usually not live long enough to realize any benefit to waiting for collection. This is even more certain when the time value of money is added to the calculation (i.e., investment/interest/present value calculations). At any time, a military retiree can apply to the Veteran's Administration to be evaluated for a "service-connected disability." [fthe evaluation shows such a disability, a rating is given between 10% and 100%, and "compensation" is paid monthly from the VA in accordance with a schedule giving a dollar sum corresponding to each 10% increase, plus certain additional awards for certain serious disabilities. Still further waivers of retired pay for VA disability pay can be given if the retiree has dependents (a spouse or children, or even dependent parents). It makes sense for a retiree to obtain a disability award, even with a dollar-for-dollar reduction in retired pay, because the disability awards are received taxfree. 10. The Amended Default Decree of Divorce (from which this appeal is taken) was entered on or about January 25, 2007. This Decree awarded Mother sole legal and physical custody of the minor children, in addition to child support, spousal support, property and fees, etc. First, the Missouri definition recognizes that "joint physical custody" could exist even if parents do not have an equal time share. The FLS asks the Supreme Court to clarify that an award of joint physical custody should not be an option the trial court may consider unless some objective minimum time threshold is established. i) pay to that spouse from the member's disposable retired pay the least amount directed to be paid during that month by any such conflicting court order, but not more than the amount of disposable retired pay which remains availab1e for payment of such courts orders bas ed on when such court orders were effectively served and the limitations of paragraph (1) and subparagraph (8) of paragraph (4); The court agreed that contingency fees are permissible in domestic relations actions to collect past-due payments (so long as the fee is reasonable, any court-awarded fees were credited against the contingent fee, and the client was advised of the options of hiring counsel hourly or seeking services from the district attorney's office). Further, the court apparently approved contingency fees in actions to modify property settlements "independent of support issues," taking the time to disagree with Ethics and Professional Responsibility Committee Formal Op. 16 (1993), which had indicated that any property settlement modification "necessarily" affected alimony, making contingent fees impermissible. An oddity which has arisen in the modern world of increasing federalization of traditional State regulation of domestic relations law bears repetition in this jurisdiction primer. Specifically, when a Court intends to divide military retired pay as the community property of a member and a spouse, another requirement besides traditional subject matter and personal jurisdiction is in play. B> The Nevada Supreme Court has struggled with alimony cases since such cases have been decided; even the case lines developed since the "no fault" era began half a century ago have been inconsistent and unpredictable, in both approach and results. 3) This section does not authorize any court to order a member to apply for retirement or retire at a particular time in order to effectuate any payment under this section. Before the effective date of the 1990 amendments (February 4, 1991), amounts deducted for payment to a former spouse were still considered wages of the retired member for withholding purposes.1 The member had income withheld on the entire gross amount, the resulting "disposable" pay was divided, and the member was entitled to a refund of taxes withheld on amounts paid to the former spouse. The former spouse then owed full taxes on whatever she received. Any percentage divisions of retirement benefits under the former law increased property distribution to the member and reduced them to the former spouse as a matter of course.1 If the designation of a former spouse as beneficiary is made by a member, it technically is to be written, signed by the member, and received by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service within one year after the date of the decree of divorce, dissolution, or annulment.6 At the time of the election, the member must submit a written statement to the appropriate Service Secretary. The statement must be signed by both the former spouse and the member, and state whether the election is being made pursuant to the requirements of a court order or a written voluntary agreement previously entered into by the member as a part of or incident to a divorce, dissolution, or annulment proceeding. If pursuant to a written agreement, the statement must state whether such a voluntary agreement was incorporated in, ratified or approved by a court order.7 The former wife and children sought, in addition to litigating property purported to be held in join tenancy, to impress a constructive trust for the benefit of the children upon the proceeds of life insurance policies in the husband’s name. The district court entered judgment against the husband’s estate for accrued child support and interest in the amount of $46,219.96. The district court impressed a constructive trust over proceeds of life insurance, but limited that trust to $50,000. The district court found that the husband intended to provide life insurance for the benefit of the first wife and the children in the amount of $50,000, and that the court in its decree so intended. The former wife and children appealed from the ruling limiting the constructive trust to $50,000, contending that all life insurance proceeds should be subject to the trust. The Court noted if the daughter was a member of the family of the deceased, it was the duty of the court on proper application, by force of the foregoing statutes, to set the insurance money apart for her use. The executrix urged that by awarding the custody of the daughter to the divorced wife, had the same effect as to the daughter, that it established her legal family status separate and apart from the father. The Court rejected the claim. The Court held that the father’s interest in his child was in no way affected, nor was his natural and legal obligation of support relieved by the decree. The Court further held that mother’s right of custody was merely a personal privilege, which she might at any time waive, and actually did waive. Where there is another action pending, however, granting a "status-only" divorce effectively bifurcates the action, since those issues remain pending before a court. Since this is forbidden under Gojack, one State must defer to the other under principles of comity and abstention. Even where this view has not been reexamined on its merits, courts have allowed the concept of fees based upon "results obtained" or "reasonable value of result achieved" in domestic litigation cases and concluded that such fees do not constitute impermissible contingent fees. See, e.g., Eckell v. Wilson, 597 A.2d 696 (Pa. Super. 1991); In re Marriage of Malec, 562 N.E.2d 1010 (Ill. App. 1990); cf., State ex ref. Okla. Bar Ass 'n v. Fagin, 848 P.2d 11 (Okla. 1992). Anecdotal accounts, however, indicate that some trial courts continue to be misled into ruling to the contrary, based upon an overly-expansive reading of Mansell and misplaced concerns about violating the Supremacy Clause, or simply by seeing the word "disability" and reacting without any sort of adequate inquiry into what the law is, or why. 3. The presumption that more parenting time by the ARP results in greater expenditures which should result in a reduction to the ARP's support obligation may be rebutted by evidence. The decree required the husband to pay alimony of $400 per month for ten years, followed by $200 per month for an additional ten years. The decree provided, however, that alimony would terminate if the wife remarried. The husband paid alimony until the wife remarried. The wife later discovered that her new husband had not divorced his first wife. She then had the marriage annulled and petitioned the district court to reinstate the alimony obligations and to award arrearages from the date on which the husband stopped making his payments. The district court denied wife’s request for all of the arrearages, but the court reinstated alimony from the date of the wife’s annulment. The Supreme Court reversed. The Court noted that under NRS 125.150(5) and the decree, alimony payments were to cease upon remarriage. The Court held that the term remarriage, as used in the decree and NRS 125.150(5), meant the solemnization or ceremony of remarriage, without regard to whether the remarriage is later determined to be void or voidable. Range of potential upward deviation is $0 (support was not reduced by the presumptive maximum amount). However, the Court could increase support based on a determination of the increased costs being incurred in the majority time-share parent's household by virtue of the lack of the minority-time share parent's visitation. The Department of Defense Office of the Actuary publishes "lump sum equivalency" charts for military retirements, using military-specific mortality tables, and including a muchignored disclaimer that its figures "should not be used for property settlements.?" The figures are updated annually, and can be downloaded from the DFAS website, www.dod.mil/dfas. The parties were divorced in Nevada. The husband was ordered to pay $30 per month per child. The wife moved to California. The husband filed in California seeking to change custody. California refused and increased child support to $60 per month per child. The husband stopped paying. The wife initiated a URESA action in California. The action was forwarded to Nevada. The husband and the district attorney stipulated to a judgment requiring the husband to pay $30 per month. Six years later, the wife obtained a judgment in California against the husband at $60 per month. The district court held that the URESA order obtained in Nevada did not supersede any previous order of support and that the wife did not waive any rights by initiating the action. The Court applied the six year statute of limitations. The Court held that payments made pursuant to a URESA order in Nevada are to be credited against amounts accrued for the same period under the support order of another state. The theory applied was phrased differently from one court to another, but was essentially that of constructive trust. Once a divorce divided the military retirement benefits, the money awarded to the former spouse was no longer considered the member’s property to convert. If the member subsequently applied for and received disability benefits, or took any other action to redirect money already ordered paid to the former spouse back to himself, he violated the divorce decree. 2) Apply the following Parental Time Offset Equation to adjust base support to reflect some of the cost shifts and savings associated with the child spending time with both Two Texas cases primarily distinguished what a court (in Texas, anyway) should do when faced with a current divorce proceeding, on the one hand, versus a contempt enforcement proceeding, on the other. A North Dakota case focused on the necessity, in a contempt proceeding, for the underlying decree to specify just what it is that the former spouse was to receive. Finally, a case from Arizona represented a maturing of the analysis on this point. The Court thus has embraced a "solution" that really does not solve the problem, and still permits the cancer of personal bias to exist in our courts and affect the outcomes of cases. In addition to reaffirming prior holdings that attorney’s fees could be awarded in postdivorce matters, the Court noted that because the billing statements were sealed and the district court reviewed them in camera, it was unable to assess the validity of the award of attorney fees. The Court concluded that to grant attorney fees based upon sealed billing statements unfairly prevented the father from disputing the amount and legitimacy of the award. The district court’s order was reversed with instructions to the district court to allow the father to review and dispute expenses contained within the billing statement. The USFSPA is both jurisdictional and procedural; it both permits the state courts to distribute military retirement to former spouses, and provides a method for enforcement of these orders through the military pay center. The USFSPA itself does not give former spouses an automatic entitlement to any portion of members’ pay. Only state laws can provide for division of military retirement pay in a divorce, or provide that alimony or child support are to be paid from military retired pay. Rights granted by state law are limited by federal law, even if state law does not so provide, and even if the courts of the states do not see any such limitations.7 Some courts have refused to permit the member to effectively transfer non-reviewable custody to a third party while staying the non-military parent’s access to the courts for child custody.6 In other contexts, courts have been much less sympathetic to arguments based on the parental preference doctrine.7 Milton, age 70, was very wealthy when he met 40-year old Abigail in 1992. At his request, she stopped working to allow joint travel. They wed in 1993 - with a premarital agreement in place. Bliss was short-lived, and by the end of 1994, Milton filed for divorce. But after 19 months of separation, the divorce proceedings were abandoned and the parties reconciled, each making "certain [unspecified] promises" memorialized in a reconciliation agreement. II. The Supreme Court’s Adoption of the Missouri Definition of "Joint Physical Custody" Is Appropriate, but the FLS Requests Guidance as to What Constitutes a "Significant but Not Necessarily Equal" Time Share and to Define All Forms of Custody After 2014, spousal suits based on regular VA waiver disability applications should no longer be happening - at least for those with a disability award of 50% or more and who are taking benefits under the CRDP, not the CRSC, program. For those with lesser VA disability percentages, the legal issues are identical, but the dollars at stake are (necessarily) lesser.

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